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MERGERS AND MONOPOLIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
CYCLICAL EFFECT OF ANTI-COMPETITION AND A LACK OF 
RATE REGULATION IN HEALTH CARE 
ABSTRACT 
Health care costs continue to rise, forcing consumers to make difficult 
choices between seeking expensive treatment and risking the consequences 
without.  To combat the inflation of health care costs, the Affordable Care Act 
implemented a number of policies aimed at improving the quality of care while 
lowering the cost of that care. In order to accomplish the goals of the 
Affordable Care Act, health care systems began merging with one another and 
acquiring smaller groups to incorporate into a vast network of providers. 
However, many of these mergers offer little value to consumers. Instead, they 
ultimately drive up the cost of health care services, often with minimal 
improvements in the quality of care. On the other side of the health care 
spectrum, medical device manufacturers have managed to control lawmakers 
through extensive lobbying efforts, eliminating competition from more 
affordable alternatives and limiting regulations that could be beneficial for 
consumers. Using a health system and a medical device case study to examine 
such problems, this article demonstrates how anti-competitive behavior and a 
lack of rate regulation negatively impact health care costs. It will also propose 
solutions to resolve these problems so consumers can take back control of their 
health care. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“What we have in the industry, in the provider market, is a hard-wired 
market strategy to seek and exploit market power,” Barak Richman, Professor 
of Law at Duke University1 
Competition laws have long been an issue of contention with hospital 
mergers and acquisitions. More recently with the advancement of treatment 
options, the medical technology field has also become rife with monopolistic 
concerns. With the ever-increasing market goal of expansion, profitability, and 
market-control in health care, antitrust issues are highly relevant today.2 
Contributing to the care provider side of this, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
encourages hospitals, physician groups, and even insurers to create accountable 
care organizations (ACOs) or similar coordinated care systems in the hope that 
they will increase quality and access to health care while reducing costs for 
all.3 A pattern has emerged within the health care industry that suggests there 
is a relationship between competition problems and rate regulations. Because 
of the unique nature of health care, each level of provider contributes to the 
rising costs of medical care through this relationship. 
Health care provider groups often merge with each other to create larger 
organizations for financial reasons, and most do not present competition 
concerns for antitrust authorities.4 However, mergers that do raise concerns are 
typically handled federally by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the 
United States (U.S.) Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division, 
although state attorneys general are also able to investigate cases.5 Often when 
antitrust issues develop, the solution is a consent agreement between the 
parties, wherein the competitive concern is eliminated, usually through 
divestiture of an interest, and the agreement can continue.6 Sometimes, the 
 
 1. Jay Hancock, Expert: Hospital’s ‘Humongous Monopoly’ Drives Prices High, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 4, 2013), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/expert-hospitals-humongous-mo 
nopoly-drives-prices-high/. 
 2. See generally Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2015), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/ 
(warning that ACO’s “could lead to greater consolidation in the health care industry, which could 
allow some providers to charge more”); see also Martin Gaynor, Dir., Bureau of Econ., Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Letter to the Editor, Health Law and Antitrust, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014, at 
A22, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/opinion/health-law-and-antitrust.html. 
 3. See generally Gold, supra note 2. 
 4. Guide to Antitrust Laws: Mergers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/ 
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). Ninety-five 
percent of mergers raise no competition concerns. Id. 
 5. Guide to Antitrust Laws: The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, www.ftc.gov/tips-ad 
vice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 6. See Guide to Antitrust Laws: Mergers, supra note 4. 
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FTC or DOJ will bring the matter before a court to prevent the merger from 
occurring in any form.7 
Historically, there were periods of time when companies were more 
successful with freely merging, and others, like now, when the agencies are 
more successful in controlling the parameters of mergers.8 One of the greatest 
differences between older cases and more recent cases is the effect the ACA 
has had on the design of care systems. The goal of the ACA is to improve 
access to affordable, quality health care, but also to encourage providers to be 
more efficient and better utilize available funds and incentives.9 The eventual 
goal of the ACA is to reduce spending for consumers and the government, in 
an attempt to substantially, yet gradually, lessen the national expenditures 
associated with health care services.10 Health care providers hope to fulfill the 
ACA’s goals by joining together and implementing new policies to improve 
patient quality and decrease provider spending.11 However, as providers take 
steps toward achieving the goals of the ACA, the methods used to achieve this 
success often include reducing vital competition. The reduction of provider 
competition has helped enable health care costs to soar well beyond that of 
other developed nations, while offering few quality improvements compared to 
those nations.12 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Michael R. Bissegger, The Evanston Initial Decision: Is There a Future for Patient 
Flow Analysis?, 39 J. HEALTH L. 143, 154 (2006). Most cases lost by the DOJ and FTC were due 
to the agencies’ inability to demonstrate a relevant geographic market. Id. In the late 1980s and 
1990s, these agencies began better defining a narrow geographic market area in antitrust disputes 
and consequently were more successful in their actions against merging care groups. Id. This 
created the rule of thumb for merger analysis as “narrow market, government wins; broad market, 
government losses.” Id. 
 9. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012). 
 10. Deficit-Reducing Health Care Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE, www.whitehouse.gov/econo 
my/reform/deficit-reducing-health-care-reform (last visited Jan. 30, 2016). 
 11. See Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., New hospitals and Health Care 
Providers Join Successful, Cutting-edge Federal Initiative That Cuts Costs and Puts Patients at the 
Center of Their Care (Jan. 11, 2016), www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/01/11/new-hospitals-and-
health-care-providers-join-successful-cutting-edge-federal-initiative.html (announcing 121 new 
participants in Medicare ACOs). 
 12. Diane Archer, No Competition: The Price of a Highly Concentrated Health Care 
Market, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/03/06/no-competi 
tion-the-price-of-a-highly-concentrated-health-care-market/; Health Spending: Trends and 
Impact, KAISER FAM. FOUND., slide 4 (Apr. 16, 2013), www.slideshare.net/KaiserFamilyFounda 
tion/health-spending-trends-and-impact?redirected_from=save_on_embed; KAREN DAVIS ET AL., 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY 26 (2014). 
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Another factor influencing the exorbitance of health care costs is a lack of 
substantial rate regulation in the American economy.13 This concept of rate 
regulation refers to the government’s ability to monitor and control rates in 
various industries through the creation of regulations.14 The regulatory issues 
in health care are widely attributable to the political atmosphere that has 
developed national policies over the past several decades.15 This issue of rate 
regulation, or lack thereof, is troubling for the American population as health 
care expenses now make up around seventeen percent of the gross domestic 
product, for a total expense of 2.9 trillion dollars for American consumers.16 
To understand the issues surrounding rate regulation, it is important to 
understand the foundation of the health care payment system that has allowed 
physicians, hospitals, and other health care organizations to transform the 
health care industry into an extremely profitable field. It is also important to 
understand the role secondary industry participants, like manufacturers of 
medical devices, play in this payment scheme and the lack of effective rate 
regulation. These two relatively different industries create a tale of two cities, 
with each demonstrating separate paths for the rise and maintenance of market 
power, yet with interwoven effects that ultimately yield the same result. 
To put some of these issues in context, this article will examine the factors 
that have created the inefficient health care market the U.S. has today. This 
article will then examine and compare the competitive concerns of two health 
care industries: the provider industry and the medical device industry. These 
two industries utilize different approaches to maneuver through applicable 
laws and regulations, but both have resulted in financial harm to consumers. In 
performing this analysis, this article will scrutinize a contested settlement in 
Massachusetts between Partners HealthCare System and the state attorney 
general. This case analysis will demonstrate the antitrust issues and ultimate 
costs that eventually fall to consumers when hospitals and other health care 
organizations merge. This article will also discuss the drawbacks and benefits 
to merging and consolidating services in relation to patient expenses. Further, 
 
 13. Noam Schimmel, Opinion, Regulating U.S. Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012), 
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/opinion/regulating-us-health-care.html. 
 14. See State Approval of Health Insurance Rate Increases, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance-rate-approval-disapprov 
al.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2016) (providing an example of the government’s ability to monitor 
and control rates in the health insurance industry through regulation of premiums). 
 15. See generally Timothy S. Jost, Eight Decades of Discouragement: The History of Health 
Care Cost Containment in the USA, 15 FORUM FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 53 (2012). 
 16. Micah Hartman et al., National Health Spending in 2013: Growth Slows, Remains In 
Step For Overall Economy, 34 HEALTH AFF. 150, 150 (2015); see also National Health 
Expenditures 2014 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., www.cms.gov/Re 
search-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/ 
Downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
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it will demonstrate how the rising medical costs come full circle, beginning 
with the manufacturing of the products all the way to the consumer’s pocket. It 
will also investigate various proposals to reduce costs, though the effectiveness 
of these proposals may vary. As consumers become more aware of the factors 
that influence quality and cost of health care, there is hope that combined 
pressure from a variety of sources will force providers and secondary health 
care companies to lower prices, or, in the alternative, that this pressure will 
lead to stricter rate regulations of the provider and medical device industries. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The history of health care demonstrates that Americans have tried many 
approaches to create an affordable system with quality care.17 But why is it 
that Americans have been forced to do this time and time again? With each 
new health system approach, prices have risen, but quality of care has not. 
American consumers are constantly searching for the next best affordable 
option to health care, yet they continue to pay more for it than any other 
developed nation.18 In the U.S., consumers spend almost twenty percent of 
their gross domestic product on health care, which is double the amount spent 
in most other developed nations.19 Many researchers and economists highlight 
this discrepancy, coupled with the fact that “the results [the American] health 
care system produces are no better and often worse than the outcomes in those 
[other developed] countries.”20 
As a whole, health care systems in America have become so powerful that 
they “dominate the nation’s economy and put demands on taxpayers to a 
degree unequaled anywhere else on earth.”21 It is because of this that every 
decade or so a new health care model evolves to curb the ever-growing 
expenses of health care.22 To demonstrate this, the Kaiser Family Foundation 
graphed the cost of health care over the past fifty years and drew attention to 
the rapid increases Americans have paid for their health care.23 Each decade 
has seen exponential growth in payments, as expenses double about every ten 
 
 17. See generally Michael Millenson, Analysis: ACOs Could Have The Medicare Muscle To 
Transform Health System, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 2, 2012), khn.org/news/millenson-acos-
muscle-to-transform-system/. 
 18. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 12. 
 19. Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills are Killing Us, TIME (2013), 
http://www.uta.edu/faculty/story/2311/Misc/2013,2,26,MedicalCostsDemandAndGreed.pdf. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Millenson, supra note 17. 
 23. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 12, at slide 1. 
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years.24 This trajectory is not sustainable for the American consumers whose 
income has not inflated as quickly as their medical expenses have.25 
A. Health Care Providers 
Throughout the past few decades, the health care industry has seen many 
payment system reforms in attempts to control rising costs and improve 
deficient care. These payment reforms signified the beginning of the managed 
care era of organizations.26 In the 1980s, Congress passed legislation that 
dramatically altered hospital payments for Medicare services.27 This renewed 
plan was a “prospective payment system” in which Medicare paid pre-
determined flat rates for services based on a patient’s diagnosis.28 That system 
eliminated the “cost plus” system previously utilized, wherein hospitals were 
guaranteed a profit margin.29 While ideally the set-fee payment system saved 
Medicare from overspending, in reality, it often resulted in reduced care 
quality for patients.30 For instance, because hospitals no longer received 
payment for extended patient stays in hospitals or additional tests conducted, 
patients were released sooner than medically necessary in some cases—a 
problem which became known as the “quicker and sicker” issue.31 Determined 
to find ways around this flat-payment schedule, hospitals began transferring 
patients to other managed care settings like outpatient centers, where the 
prospective payment system did not apply.32 
Following the Medicare overhaul of the 1980s, health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) and other private insurers flourished in the 1990s by 
offering fixed payments for services in an effort to control wasteful spending 
by health care organizations.33 This plan was not without its faults though; 
hospitals went to extremes to cut patient costs in an effort not to lose money 
themselves.34 Trial and error of payment systems has resulted in some success 
and some failure, leaving legislators, health care organizations, and insurers 
confused on how best to manage costs and care. 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. at slide 15. 
 26. Jost, supra note 15, at 58, 60-70. 
 27. Millenson, supra note 17. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Millenson, supra note 17. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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A health care organization is at its heart a business; its goal is to maintain 
profitability while providing health care services,35 an ironic, yet necessary 
aspect of most any health care business. It is necessary because, without 
profits, these organizations cannot perform their most basic function: care and 
treatment. This is true regardless of tax status; organizations with non-profit, 
tax-exempt status must make money to function, just as for-profit 
organizations must. In fact, research suggests there may be little difference 
between the amount of charitable care that results in lost profits provided by 
non-profit care facilities and the amount provided by for-profit facilities.36 
Regardless, to create profitability, health care organizations need to have high 
patient volume and reimbursements and low debt and spending.37 
One recent push from Congress to control health care spending and quality 
comes from the ACA. Encouraged by the ACA, ACOs have become the latest 
payment system introduced to curb costs and improve care.38 These ACOs 
offer benefits to patients and providers alike, which makes them ideal 
compared to previous models.39 However, initial projections and the latest data 
reports show some potential concerns in whether they will ultimately garner a 
great enough market share to create a substantial benefit.40 
To help increase involvement in ACOs, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) has enacted a variety of incentive programs to entice 
care groups into the ACO structure.41 These benefits include profit-sharing 
without risk of loss-sharing when organizations do not exceed designated 
 
 35. See David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, and Regulatory Follies, 23 
J. CORP. L. 741, 742, 744 (1998). 
 36. See also David Blumenthal & Nigel Edwards, The Tale of Two Systems: The Changing 
Academic Health Center, 19 HEALTH AFF. 86, 86 (2000); Gabriel Picone et al., Are For-Profit 
Hospital Conversions Harmful to Patients and to Medicare?, 33 RAND J. ECON. 507, 507 (2002). 
See generally Hyman, supra note 35; FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING 
HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (2004), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/health_care/ 
204694.pdf. 
 37. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 630 (West 7th ed. 2013) (nonprofits chapter). 
 38. Gold, supra note 2. 
 39. Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/index.html?redirect=/ 
aco (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 40. Fact Sheets: Medicare ACOs continue to succeed in improving care, lowering cost of 
growth, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/News 
room/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-09-16.html (noting that 
only a small portion of Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACOs actually garnered 
enough savings to share in them and many ACOs have dropped out of the program since 
inception). 
 41. See Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), supra note 39; see also News and Updates, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-
Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/News.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2015). 
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benchmarks for the first three years of inception.42 By utilizing a gradual entry 
into the ACO cost-sharing program, care organizations are given time to 
acclimate to structural changes required of an ACO so they can become 
profitable with considerably less risk.43 If organizations are unable to reach 
enough benchmarks to share in savings, they may drop out of the incentive 
program altogether, opting for a non-ACO model instead.44 As such, there is 
an incentive for the government to structure the ACO benefits to be more 
attainable, which is why CMS has solicited suggestions and created a variety 
of ACO models to make the program more beneficial for all.45 
The problem ACOs and many other CMS initiatives are designed to fix is 
the popular fee-for-service model of payments for physician services. The fee-
for-service model is one in which a physician receives a payment for each 
individual service performed, as opposed to a bundled payment model, which 
would bundle a group of services together for a set fee.46 Fee-for-service has 
been the accepted method of payment in the U.S. for some time now,47 but its 
popularity does not mean it is the best payment system. 
Like the prospective payer system and HMOs of the 1980s and 1990s, fee-
for-service can incentivize doctors to make medical decisions motivated by 
profit.48 However, unlike the previous models, which undercut quality by 
potentially reducing services to fit a budget, fee-for-service encourages 
excessive care from physicians.49 By receiving a payment for each service 
provided, physicians are incentivized to order as many tests as possible to 
ensure the patient is well cared for, even if his wallet is not.50 This system has 
led to financial waste, as many services provided are not medically 
necessary.51 It has also allowed prices for equipment and services to sky-
 
 42. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING 
SHARED SAVINGS AND LOSSES UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 3, 6 (2014), 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Down 
loads/ACO_Methodology_Factsheet_ICN907405.pdf. 
 43. Id. at 2-3. 
 44. S. Lawrence Kocot et al., The Medicare Shared Savings Program: CMS Turns To 
Stakeholders On Incentivizing ACO Risk, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Dec. 19, 2014), http://health 
affairs.org/blog/2014/12/19/the-medicare-shared-savings-program-cms-turns-to-stakeholders-on-
incentivizing-aco-risk/. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bundled Payments for Care Improvements Initiative Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/ 
Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-01-30-2.html. 
 47. See Julie Barnes, Moving Away From Fee-for-Service, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-for-service/256755/. 
 48. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, ISSUE BRIEF: MOVING TOWARDS BUNDLED PAYMENT 1 (2013). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
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rocket, giving all involved in the care of a patient—from device manufacturer 
to physician—a piece of the profit margin.52 
Fee-for-service insurance coverage also exacerbated the problem of moral 
hazard, which has contributed to the overuse and overcharging of health care 
services.53 The moral hazard concept points to the overuse of unnecessary 
medical services because such services are available and covered.54 The 
American approach to health care is that more care equals better health; 
however, this is not always true.55 
B. Medical Device Industry 
Medical devices have been part of the U.S. health care industry since the 
civil war.56 By the mid-1960s, the first regulations were enacted by then 
President John F. Kennedy in an effort to prosecute companies for product 
liability.57 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the medical 
device industry,58 however, the power of the FDA in the 1960s was very 
limited in regards to medical devices.59 Throughout the next few decades, the 
FDA’s ability to monitor and regulate the medical device industry grew.60 
While the government attempted to impose regulations on the field, the 
companies producing the medical devices began to develop and grow more 
 
 52. See id. 
 53. See generally Patrick Bajari et al., Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Health 
Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis, 45 RAND J. ECON. 747, 761 (2014). 
 54. Id. at 753, 761. 
 55. Eve Kerr & John Ayanian, How to Stop the Overconsumption of Health Care, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Dec. 11, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/12/how-to-stop-the-overconsumption-of-health-
care. 
 56. Michael MacRae, The Civil War and the Birth of the U.S. Prosthetics Industry, AM. 
SOC’Y MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, www.asme.org/engineering-topics/articles/bioengineering/the-
civil-war-and-birth-of-us-prosthetics-industry (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
 57. Brief History of US Medical Device Regulation, EMERGO, http://visual.ly/brief-history-
us-medical-device-regulation (last visited Feb. 24, 2016); see Significant Dates in U.S. Food and 
Drug Law History, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ 
Milestones/ucm128305.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2014). 
 58. What We Do, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/de 
fault.htm (last updated Dec. 7, 2015). 
 59. Rodney R. Munsey, Trends and Events in FDA Regulation of Medical Devices Over the 
Last Fifty Years, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 163, 164 (1995). 
 60. Id. at 168. See generally Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra 
note 57. 
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powerful as the technology advanced.61 The most growth has occurred over the 
last few decades, as have the rates charged for the products.62 
As far as regulations are concerned, the medical device industry has 
protected itself from most regulation for years through its successful and 
extensive lobbying efforts.63 It has managed to garner support from both 
Republican and Democratic members of Congress, particularly from those 
members in whose states the manufacturers are found.64 These lobbying efforts 
are exemplified in the recent attempts to repeal the medical device tax that was 
included in the ACA.65 
Part of what has enabled the medical device industry to grow so rapidly 
and have such high profitability is the same moral hazard and American 
overuse-of-health-care approach described in the health care industry section 
above. This approach includes the idea that the most expensive option must be 
the best option, thus encouraging the medical technology industry to 
continually create new or modified drugs and devices, even when the results 
are the same as the older, cheaper, less advanced products.66 With each new 
device that boasts some new benefit, a medical device company is potentially 
able to reduce its competition and increase the price of the product. 
III.  GOVERNING LAWS AND AGENCIES 
There are three federal laws of relevance to the health care antitrust 
discussion: the Sherman Act,67 the Clayton Act,68 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
 
 61. The Medical Device Industry in the United States, SELECT USA, http://selectusa.com 
merce.gov/industry-snapshots/medical-device-industry-united-states.html (last visited Feb. 2, 
2016). 
 62. Id.; Snapshots: How Changes in Medical Technology Affect Health Care Costs, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2007), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-how-changes-in-
medical-technology-affect/; INT’L TRADE ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICES INDUSTRY ASSESSMENT 3 
(2010), http://ita.doc.gov/td/health/medical%20device%20industry%20assessment%20final%20ii 
%203-24-10.pdf. 
 63. Medical Supplies: Lobbying, 2014, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., www.opensecrets.org/ 
industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2014&ind=H4100 (last visited Apr. 21, 2016) (demonstrating that 
the total amount in dollars spent on lobbying by the medical device and supplies industry for 
2014 was $33,322,243 on behalf of 108 companies). 
 64. Gregory W. Daniel, 5 Questions About the Medical Device Tax, and Its Potential for 
Repeal, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/ 
11/12-medical-device-tax-daniel. 
 65. Daniel, supra note 64. For a greater discussion of the medical device tax and 
congressional efforts to repeal it, see infra Part V. 
 66. See Merrill Goozner, High-Tech Medicine Contributes to High-Cost Health Care, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 15, 2010), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/ft-health-care-high-
tech-costs/. 
 67. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012). 
 68. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012). 
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Antitrust Improvements Act.69 Anti-competition laws have existed since the 
original Sherman Act of 1890, which first codified a federal prohibition of 
anti-competitive or monopolistic practices.70 After the Sherman Act was 
written, the Clayton Act further clarified that the government could prevent 
and eliminate any business activities involving illegal tying contracts or 
corporate mergers and acquisitions.71 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act amended the 
Clayton Act by mandating certain companies to file premerger notifications 
with the FTC and the DOJ’s Antitrust Division if they planned to integrate.72 
These premerger notifications give the reviewing agencies time to analyze 
mergers and determine whether they are fair to consumers.73 In addition to 
those laws, there are also state laws governing antitrust practices, and the FTC 
has its own, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, which grants the 
agency the power to reject or accept mergers, investigate potential cases, 
prescribe trade regulation rules, and issue monetary redress against businesses 
that violate these laws.74 Beyond the scope of health care, the FTC and DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division oversee all types of competition issues and utilize a 
multitude of antitrust laws and regulations that have been created over the 
years to govern each field.75 The state attorneys general play a similar role in 
monitoring, investigating, and prosecuting companies that exhibit anti-
competitive practices to the degree that consumers are harmed.76 
IV.  EFFECTS OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
A. Health Care Provider Case Study and Anti-Competitive Effects 
To examine the effects of competition, or lack thereof, on health care 
service rates, the Partners HealthCare system (Partners) and the recent antitrust 
lawsuit associated with the system in Massachusetts make an excellent case 
study.77 Partners, a non-profit organization, was originally formed when two 
 
 69. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(c)-15(h), 18(a), 66 
(2012). 
 70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
 71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012). 
 75. See Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes (last visited Feb. 17, 2015); Antitrust Enforcement and 
the Consumer, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/antitrust-enfor-con 
sumer.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 76. About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/naag/about_ 
naag.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 77. See Robert Weisman & Scott Allen, Partners Pays a Price After Bid for South Shore, 
BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/08/partners-quest-for 
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hospitals, Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Massachusetts General 
Hospital, merged in 1994.78 It now boasts an impressive list of “community 
and specialty hospitals, a managed care organization, a physician network, 
community health centers, home care[,] and other health-related entities.”79 In 
its twenty-one years since inception, Partners has accumulated forty-three 
“members,” affiliated programs and centers, and collaborates with four 
research and development (R&D) programs.80 Clearly evident from the 
numbers, Partners is a massive health care organization within the state of 
Massachusetts.81 
In line with the ACA’s goals, Partners has rearranged itself as an ACO to 
improve coordinated care for patients and promote cost savings.82 As the 
largest health care system in the state of Massachusetts,83 Partners also holds 
the majority market share of health care business in the Boston area.84 
Recently, in 2012, Partners attempted two new acquisitions of South Shore 
Hospital and Harbor Medical Associates, as one group, and Hallmark Health 
System, which would further expand its market power to dominate other 
provider systems in the northeastern area of Massachusetts.85 
There are benefits and drawbacks to such a large health care system. The 
coordinated care aspect across the system and greater access to state-of-the-art 
 
-south-shore-hospital-fueled-backlash-and-debate-over-how-big-too-big/XDPn96u1jqpM8X5GB 
Z3n8H/story.html. 
 78. About Partners HealthCare, PARTNERS HEALTHCARE, http://www.partners.org/About/ 
Default.aspx?id=1 (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Partners HealthCare Members and Affiliations, PARTNERS HEALTHCARE, 
http://www.partners.org/About/Company-Information/Members.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 81. CTR. FOR HEALTH INFO. & ANALYSIS, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2 (2014) [hereinafter CHIA REPORT]. According to a 
report released in September 2014, in 2011, the most recent analysis performed by the Center for 
Health Information and Analysis (CHIA), Partners HealthCare had accumulated twenty-eight 
percent of the market share of hospital and physician payments. Id. Most notably, this number 
was three times larger than the next largest provider system. The four largest providers accounted 
for around fifty percent of the provider market. Id. 
 82. PARTNERS HEALTHCARE, PARTNERS HEALTHCARE 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 3 (2013), 
http://partnershealthcare.uberflip.com/i/307830/3. 
 83. HEALTH POLICY COMM’N, REVIEW OF PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM’S PROPOSED 
ACQUISITION OF HALLMARK HEALTH CORP. 8 (2014) [hereinafter HPC HALLMARK REPORT]; 
see also CHIA REPORT, supra note 81, at accompanying text. 
 84. Weisman & Allen, supra note 77; HA T. TU ET AL., COMMUNITY REPORT: STATE 
REFORM DOMINATES BOSTON HEALTH CARE MARKET DYNAMICS 4-5 (2010) (noting that the 
prestige and brand name of Partners hospitals in the Boston area allow the hospitals to exercise 
market leverage beyond what the market share suggests). 
 85. HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83, at 78. 
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treatment and facilities are certainly beneficial to consumers.86 However, with 
that improved care comes the substantial risk of increased costs to consumers 
because of the increase in market power, and, thus, the ability to demand 
higher prices from insurers as well as establish higher fees for services.87 
Evidence suggests there is a direct relationship between the increase in 
market power and the decrease in market competition, which results when 
health organizations merge.88 There is significant factual support that greater 
market power and less competition result in greater costs to consumers.89 A 
2012 update to a 2006 survey confirmed the findings of two prominent health 
and antitrust economists who found that hospital mergers do not typically yield 
significant savings, and those that do generally do so only because they merged 
operations completely.90 These economists also found that while such mergers 
generally raise prices significantly, they tend to lower the quality of care 
offered, an alarming trend for consumers.91 This survey is especially relevant 
to the Partners discussion described herein because it focused on the effects of 
a combination of horizontal and vertical acquisitions, both of which occur in 
the Partners case.92 
In Partners’ latest acquisition attempt of Hallmark Health System, South 
Shore Hospital, and Harbor Medical Associates, an investigation was 
conducted by both the then Attorney General of Massachusetts, Martha 
 
 86. David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 
310 [J]AMA 1964, 1967 (2013). 
 87. Hearing on Health Care Industry Consolidation Before the Subcomm. on Health of the 
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Martin Gaynor, Professor, H. 
John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie) [hereinafter Statement of 
Gaynor]. 
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83, at 44; see also Statement of Gaynor, supra 
note 87, at accompanying text; Cutler & Morton, supra note 86, at accompanying text; CHIA 
REPORT, supra note 81, at 14. In a comparison of the physician groups’ total medical 
expenditures (TME), the four largest all reported expenditures higher than the designated +3.6% 
benchmark in the major payor networks. Id. Partners Community HealthCare, Inc. (PCHI), a 
member of the Partners HealthCare System, was the only group to report that its expenditures 
were higher than the network average and TME that had increased across all payors. Id. 
 90. WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT J. TOWN, HOW HAS HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION 
AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE?, RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 9 
10 (2006); Brief for Leemore Dafny et al. as Amici Curiae at 4, Commonwealth of Mass. v. 
Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14-2033-BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. July 21, 2014) [hereinafter 
Dafny et al.]. 
 91. MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, SYNTHESIS PROJECT, THE IMPACT OF HOSPITAL 
CONSOLIDATION-UPDATE 1, 3 (2012). 
 92. Id. 
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Coakley, and the DOJ.93 After conducting her investigation, the Attorney 
General came to an unexpected solution. Instead of rejecting the merger as 
some anticipated, Coakley offered a settlement option to Partners, wherein the 
merger would be accepted with conditions that extended through the next five 
to ten years.94 
This proposed settlement was so unexpected that over 170 organizations 
submitted a brief to the court in favor of or against it.95 As a result, the 
settlement was amended to include a few more restrictions,96 although the 
judge’s approval was still required before the merger could continue. The final 
proposed settlement would allow Partners to acquire the desired hospitals and 
systems with the following stipulations: payors could split Partners into 
separate contracting entities for up to ten years; Partners would be prevented 
from contracting with affiliate physician groups not already within its own 
hospitals for ten years; health costs would be capped at the rate of inflation 
across the entire Partners network through 2020; physicians’ growth would be 
capped for five years; and additional Partners hospital expansion in eastern 
Massachusetts would be blocked for the next seven years.97 Furthermore, a 
monitor would be appointed by the Attorney General’s office and would be 
paid for by Partners to ensure compliance with these conditions over the next 
ten years.98 
The Attorney General believed this settlement would reduce Partners’ 
bargaining power in the market for a substantial number of years, while 
providing the most benefit to the consumers.99 This approach is less commonly 
utilized,100 but may become more popular as states and agencies look to 
promote the goals of the ACA through care and data integration. 
As part of her investigation, Coakley enlisted the services of the 
Massachusetts Health Policy Commission (Commission or HPC) to research 
the potential effects that would occur from this merger.101 The Commission 
 
 93. Plaintiff Commonwealth of Massachusetts Response to Public Comments at 3, 
Commonwealth of Mass. v. Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14 2033-BLS2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 25, 2014). Note, the DOJ findings have not been released as of January 2016. 
 94. See generally Joint Motion for Entry of Final Judgment by Consent, Commonwealth of 
Mass. v. Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14-2033-BLS2 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 24, 2014) 
[hereinafter Joint Motion for Consent Judgment]. 
 95. Weisman & Allen, supra note 77. 
 96. See generally Joint Motion for Entry of Amended Final Judgment by Consent, 
Commonwealth of Mass. v. Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14-2033-BLS2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Joint Motion for Amended Judgment]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.; Joint Motion for Consent Judgment, supra note 94. 
 99. Joint Motion for Amended Judgment, supra note 96. 
 100. Brief for the Am. Antitrust Inst. as Amicus Curiae at 2, Commonwealth of Mass. v. 
Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14-2033-BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2014). 
 101. HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83, at 1. 
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was established in 2012 to help control rising health care costs for consumers 
in Massachusetts.102 For 2014, the Commission established a benchmark of 
3.6% for a sustainable rate of growth of health care expenditures, meaning that 
such expenditures should not exceed that growth rate.103 The Commission 
undertook the task of analyzing whether the proposed merger between 
Partners, South Shore, and Hallmark would actually benefit consumers or 
whether it would force costs to exceed the benchmark. It wrote multiple reports 
analyzing the proposed merger and settlement, all of which found critical 
information lacking to support the parties’ assertions or found that the merger 
would harm consumers.104 
For this review, the Commission looked at the stated goals of the merger 
and all information provided by the parties that supported how and when the 
merger would improve the market.105 The Commission’s Hallmark Final 
Report noted that Partners and Hallmark had the highest share of inpatient and 
primary care services and Partners hospitals had higher prices than almost all 
others in each region in which it operated.106 Both Hallmark and Partners 
hospitals generally met or exceeded quality benchmarks, though physician 
groups for Hallmark met or were below the state average.107 Most substantial 
in the report, the Commission found that rather than reduce spending, the 
proposed settlement would increase spending in northeast Massachusetts by 
$15.5 to twenty-three million dollars each year.108 The Commission 
determined that this increase would not be offset by savings from reduced 
utilization of services through population health management.109 The 
Commission noted that the merger would likely increase care access and 
improve quality, but that the health system failed to provide critical 
information to prove that these assertions would actually come to fruition.110 
In the Commission’s South Shore and Harbor Medical Final Report, it 
reported very similar findings. It determined that medical spending would 
actually increase twenty-three million dollars to twenty-six million dollars each 
year because of increased physician prices and facility utilization.111 Therefore, 
the system would be able “to leverage higher prices and other favorable 
 
 102. Id. at Introduction. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1-4. 
 105. Id. at Introduction. 
 106. HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83, at 2. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 4. 
 111. HEALTH POLICY COMM’N, REVIEW OF PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM’S PROPOSED 
ACQUISITION OF SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL AND HARBOR MEDICAL ASSOCIATES 2 (2014) 
[hereinafter HPC SOUTH SHORE REPORT]. 
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contract terms in negotiations with commercial [payors].”112 Moreover, this 
improved leverage is not included in the increased medical spending estimates 
stated above.113 Again, the Commission noted that while there would likely be 
improvements in care delivery and health outcomes, Partners again did not 
provide enough evidence to prove that increased costs would affect overall 
quality performance at the South Shore facilities, where such performance is 
already strong.114 The Commission determined that these mergers would not 
be an economically beneficial decision for consumers without additional 
information explaining why integration is necessary to accomplish Partners’ 
goals.115 
In early 2015, the judge presiding over the case rejected the entire 
settlement, finding that there was not enough evidence of pro-competitive 
effects to counter the potential anti-competitive harm.116 After receiving this 
blow, Partners decided to withdraw its acquisition of South Shore Hospital, 
although it planned to continue its acquisition of Hallmark Health Corp.117 
The Partners merger is a great example of the correlation between anti-
competitive provider behavior and rising health care costs. It shows, through 
all the empirical evidence analyzed and described by the Commission, how a 
lack of regulation or insufficiently utilized, authoritative power over an 
industry has the potential to elicit detrimental consequences on consumers. 
Part of what makes the proposed Partners settlement offer so unique is its 
attempt to regulate the system by applying conditions to be met, known as 
conduct remedies,118 instead of rejecting the merger or requiring some 
structural change. There are two types of remedies commonly employed to 
regulate the massive health care industry—structural remedies, which include 
divestiture of assets, and conduct remedies, which include obligations or 
changing conduct.119 However, neither remedy has been able to adequately 
control the overall cost escalation in the industry. 
Structural remedies are often preferred over conduct remedies because they 
are more effective at eliminating the anti-competitive concern in most mergers, 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 2-3. 
 116. Priyanka McCluskey & Robert Weisman, Partners’ Deal to Acquire Three Hospitals 
Rejected, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/01/29/part 
ners/s9TxpYCBakjPN6pDbBFHGL/story.html. 
 117. Press Release, Mass. Attorney Gen. Maura Healey, AG Healey Statement on Partners 
Decision to Withdraw Intent to Acquire South Shore Hospital (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.mass. 
gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2015/2015-02-17-ag-stmt-partners-withdraw.html. 
 118. Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 4-7. 
 119. Id. at 4; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHAPTER 9: REMEDIES 149 (2008), www.justice.gov/sites/de 
fault/files/atr/legacy/2008/09/12/236681_chapter9.pdf. 
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but the health care industry has so many additional forces influencing it that 
these remedies have limited effect.120 In other industries, such remedies may 
be more effective, but the nature of health care is one of continual need. People 
will never stop needing the services offered, so the providers have an innate 
power that allots them great control. This power gives them the ability to 
determine base prices, negotiate with private and public payors, and increase 
costs virtually whenever they choose. Because of this paradox, rate regulations 
may be more influential than structural or conduct remedies as the ACA takes 
effect. 
One of the most important effects anti-competitive mergers have on 
consumers is the rise in health care costs. To understand the way these mergers 
affect consumer costs, it is crucial to understand how health care organizations 
charge patients. Most notably, hospitals use a system known as the 
chargemaster, which allows them to negotiate compensation with payors.121 A 
chargemaster is essentially a master list of hospital services, items, and 
procedures and their associated fees.122 
When hospitals first started using chargemasters in the 1930s, all 
consumers were charged the same rate, which was originally calculated at the 
cost of providing the service plus ten percent, regardless of insurance.123 
However, when Medicare was created, it required a differentiation between 
actual cost and charges, wherein Medicare paid only the cost, while all other 
consumers paid charges (service cost plus hospital charges).124 Then when 
managed care took over the market, insurers negotiated reduced rates for their 
beneficiaries.125 These changes eventually led to the chargemaster system in 
place today, which has little to no relation to the actual costs of items and 
procedures incurred by the hospitals.126 
Medicare continues to pay hospitals a flat rate, which it determines based 
on an evaluation of a multitude of diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) for each 
hospital.127 However, many hospitals say the Medicare rates do not cover the 
full expenses undertaken by a hospital, and, thus, force the hospital to operate 
at a loss for those patients.128 
In markets where a health care system controls a majority of hospitals and 
physician groups, there are generally higher prices for services and products 
 
 120. Id.; Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 4. 
 121. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 11, 
16-24 (2014). 
 122. Id. at 16. 
 123. Id. at 17. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Brown, supra note 121, at 17. 
 127. Id. at 19. 
 128. Id. at 24. 
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offered at those facilities.129 Having the majority of market power, or even a 
large part of it, enables hospitals to set prices for their chargemaster at higher 
rates because there is less competition.130 This has become more evident in 
some areas, like Boston, where one or two hospital chains dominate a majority 
of the market and have commanded higher prices from insurers and employers, 
with little to prevent them from continuing in this pattern.131 The great 
variance in pricing is evidence that the health care system needs additional 
regulation for consideration of anti-competitive behaviors. 
Adding to the problem, each insurance company negotiates different rates 
with each hospital it contracts with as a provider,132 so consumers may not 
always expect to receive the same rate for the same service at any of the in-
network facilities. Consumers with insurance coverage pay only a small 
percentage of the actual chargemaster list price.133 However, for those 
consumers without insurance or for those who use an out-of-network provider, 
with whom their insurance company has no contract, the consumer may be 
forced to pay the full list price,134 a daunting prospect to anyone. Even more 
concerning, the arranged prices between insurers and hospitals are considered 
confidential,135 so price competition is difficult to implement. 
This very issue was brought to public light in 1996 when Partners and 
BlueCross BlueShield of Massachusetts allegedly came to an arrangement 
regarding price setting for physician services at a significantly higher rate than 
before.136 This agreement allegedly promised that BlueCross BlueShield would 
give Partners’ physicians the biggest insurance payment in exchange for 
Partners’ requiring all other insurers to offer equal or higher payments, thus 
making BlueCross the most competitive offer though significantly more 
expensive than before.137 Though neither party will admit to this exact deal, 
the sudden rate increase that occurred shortly after suggests evidence of its 
truth.138 While the public will likely never know officially, a less dramatic 
version of this is far too common. Insurers negotiate rates with hospitals all the 
 
 129. Elisabeth Rosenthal, As Hospital Prices Soar, a Stitch Tops $500, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 
2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/12/03/health/as-hospital-costs-soar-single-stitch-tops-
500.html_?r=0. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id.; see Weisman & Allen, supra note 77. 
 132. Brown, supra note 121, at 21-22. 
 133. Id. at 22. 
 134. Id.; see also Rosenthal, supra note 129; Brill, supra note 19. 
 135. Brown, supra note 121, at 22. 
 136. Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, A Handshake That Made Healthcare History, BOS. 
GLOBE (Dec. 28, 2008), http://www.bostonglobe.com/specials/2008/12/28/handshake-that-made-
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 137. Id. 
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time, but consumers are not privy to those conversations or the terms to which 
they are agreed,139 and are thus unable to control their own costs. 
Moreover, this system punishes those with the least bargaining power—
those who are also the least likely to be able to afford the extraordinary 
charges.140 Patients who seek hospital services and are not covered by a 
government-sponsored program or insurance may expect to pay a markup of 
1,400% or more for a simple test.141 This concept of variable rates for different 
payors is known as price discrimination, and it is completely legal.142 Hospitals 
justify this price disparity by explaining that the lost profits from Medicare, 
Medicaid, or unpaid debts of self-payors require them to make up the 
difference by charging more to others—a cost-sharing rationale similar to that 
used by insurance companies—called the cost-shifting theory.143 
Health economists seem to view this cost-shifting theory promoted by 
hospitals to rationalize price discrimination with skepticism.144 In their own 
studies, some economists found that the reason for higher costs was more 
likely due to a hospital’s market power, not its need to make up for 
government-payor shortfalls.145 They also noted that when paid by Medicare, 
hospitals often cut their own costs or output, thus eliminating the need to offset 
expenses to other consumers.146 The fact that these negotiations continue to 
exist between hospitals and insurers demonstrates the lack of rate regulations 
that govern these relationships in regards to appropriate payments. Each 
hospital offers different prices based on whatever factors they believe are 
 
 139. Brown, supra note 121, at 22. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See generally id.; Brill, supra note 19. Patient was charged $199.50 for Troponin test 
when Medicare would have paid the hospital $13.94 for that test. Id. This exemplifies the cost 
valuation that Medicare has deemed appropriate for that service for the hospital including 
overhead costs, regional differences, and other factors. Id. 
 142. Brown, supra note 121, at 24. 
 143. Uwe Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the Flawed Theory of 
Cost Shifting: Is It Time for A More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2125, 2125-26 
(2011). 
 144. See Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift? A Review of the Evidence, 89 
MILBANK Q. 90, 90-91 (2011); Chapin White, Contrary to Cost-Shift Theory, Lower Medicare 
Hospital Rates for Impatient Care Lead to Lower Private Payment Rates, 32 HEALTH AFF. 935, 
941-42 (2013). 
 145. See Frakt, supra note 144; see ROBERT MURRAY & SUZANNE F. DELBANCO, PROVIDER 
MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: ASSESSING ITS IMPACT AND LOOKING 
AHEAD 15-16 (2012). 
 146. See David Dranove et al., How Do Hospitals Respond to Negative Financial Shocks? 
The Impact of the 2008 Stock Market Crash 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 18853, 2013). But see James Robinson, Hospitals Respond To Medicare Payment Shortfalls 
By Both Shifting Costs And Cutting Them, Based On Market Concentration, 30 HEALTH AFF. 
1265, 1269-70 (2011) (concluding that hospitals may cut costs, although some may shift costs, 
depending on location or market). 
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important and there is no national or state standard that hospitals must follow 
to determine these prices.147 
B. Medical Device Industry Case Study and Anti-Competitive Effects 
There are other factors that play into the rates set by hospitals, primarily 
the increasing cost of medical devices, drugs, and equipment, which 
themselves are controlled by the same market power concept of hospitals and 
health care groups. For instance, one of the most common surgical procedures 
in America today is joint replacement.148 The price for these procedures varies 
from hospital to hospital, as the chargemaster prices are determined on an 
individual hospital basis.149 
As an example, for one man, a hip replacement in the U.S. was estimated 
to cost $78,000 plus other fees, with $13,000 of that being the actual device.150 
That steep price for a replacement joint was the “list price” with no markup, 
essentially the price the hospital paid for the device.151 Due to the high cost of 
the repair in the U.S., the man opted to get the joint replaced in Belgium, 
where he paid $13,660 including surgery, device, therapy, and airfare.152 This 
anecdote shows not only the great discrepancy in health care treatment costs, 
but also the discrepancy of the medical equipment costs between the U.S. and 
other developed nations.153 
Even though there are thousands of medical device companies worldwide, 
many of the markets are controlled by a select few. For instance, despite there 
being about 6,500 medical device companies in the U.S., ninety-one percent of 
the joint replacement market is controlled by six companies in the U.S.154 The 
global medical device industry is also dominated by U.S. companies, which 
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hold thirty-eight percent of the entire industry market as of 2012.155 These 
companies have managed to limit or avoid many regulations through their 
extensive lobbying of Congress,156 though they have experienced some 
pushback from the DOJ relating to kickback schemes.157 
The medical device companies often manage to undercut the industry and 
prevent generics and foreign-made products from entering the market largely 
through trade policy, patents, and an expensive FDA process that discourages 
potential start-ups.158 While trying to prevent foreign countries from exporting 
devices to the U.S., these companies expect the U.S. government to negotiate 
with other countries to reduce barriers for U.S. products.159 
Additionally, health care organizations that buy the products have 
surprisingly little bargaining power, much like the uninsured do against 
hospitals, because there are so few options and products are not bought in 
bulk.160 The parallel between hospitals and the medical device manufacturing 
industry versus consumers and hospitals is ironically clear. Both of these 
relationships exemplify the effects of strong market power, lack of 
competition, and lack of rate regulation. Unfortunately, the ultimate loser of 
both battles is the consumer, who will likely bear the large brunt of the costs 
that pass on to them. 
V.  ADDITIONAL ANTITRUST CONSEQUENCES AND CONCERNS 
Despite the general antitrust laws that help monitor and prohibit anti-
competitive business practices before they happen, there is also a huge 
problem of what happens to consumers after mergers are allowed. Specifically, 
once hospitals merge and create massive health systems, do those governing 
agencies actually protect consumers from price-gouging? Once hospitals have 
taken over a large part of the market, there is little that can be done to reduce 
costs to consumers.161 Even if the hospital systems have “passed the tests” of 
 
 155. SELECT USA, supra note 61. 
 156. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., supra note 63. 
 157. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Medical Device Company 
Smith & Nephew Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2012/medical-device-company-smith-nephew-re 
solves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation; Press Release, U.S. Attorney Dist. of N.J., 
Wright Medical Technology, Inc. Agrees to Corporate Compliance Reforms and Monitor 
Oversight to Address Alleged Violations of Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2010/Wright%20Medical%20Complaint,%20
DPA%20PR.pdf. 
 158. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 62, at 13. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Rosenthal, supra note 129. 
 161. To demonstrate this problem, the amicus brief filed in the Partners case noted a 
prominent FTC case from 2000. See Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 5. There, Evanston 
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competitive effect, they may still conduct unfair consumer practices in the way 
they charge for services, treatments, and general care.162 This is one of the 
biggest reasons health care today is so expensive in the U.S.163 
A. Partners’ Settlement Concerns 
The scenario described above is also a potential reason the Attorney 
General in Massachusetts may have proposed a settlement with Partners—as 
an effort to control rate-hikes for the following five to ten years. However, the 
biggest complaint by opposition against this settlement was the concern for 
what happens when this time constraint runs out. The settlement offered no 
permanent solutions that would effectuate long-term change for the health care 
system. While potentially beneficial for the next five to ten years, after that 
deadline, Partners would be free to increase rates to whatever it chooses, 
though it would likely remain within the allotted benchmark for medical 
expenditures. This means that Partners’ hospitals could and would likely 
increase the chargemaster prices that are determined for services and 
equipment offered by the hospital. Furthermore, Partners would be very 
capable of demanding higher insurance payments for physicians within its 
system because it would have such a dominant market share within the area.164 
Without the merger, Partners had a twenty-eight percent share of the entire 
Massachusetts market, but with the merger, this number would certainly 
increase.165 In fact, using data from the Center for Health Information and 
Analysis (CHIA) and the HPC, the merger would give Partners roughly a fifty 
percent market share within metro Boston, a fifty percent share within South 
Shore, and a forty-seven percent and thirty-five percent share in North Boston 
and West Boston, respectively.166 Even with the restrictions the settlement 
would place on Partners limiting further expansion for the next five to ten 
 
Northwestern Healthcare was able to acquire Highland Park hospital with no structural or conduct 
remedies. Id. Shortly after, inpatient prices increased by fifty percent to payors, significantly 
greater than others in the area. Id. There were no noticeable quality improvements either. Id. The 
merger was found anti-competitive in 2005 and affirmed by the FTC in 2007, but at that point, 
too much integration had occurred, and it was impossible to force divestiture of the hospital. Id. 
The FTC issued an independent contract negotiating team for the Highland hospital but this team 
was never utilized because its usefulness would be minimal. See Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 5. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Brill, supra note 19. 
 164. See Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 6-7. When a similar conduct remedy was offered to a 
merging health care system in Grand Rapids, Michigan in 1996, the prices increased twelve 
percent when the remedy terms expired in 2004. Id. These rates continued to exceed the consumer 
price index for years following the terms’ expiration. Id. 
 165. See CHIA REPORT, supra note 81, at 6. 
 166. See Weisman & Allen, supra note 77 (these figures were determined by adding the 
market share controlled by Partners to the market share of South Shore and Hallmark, as the 
graph indicates on the article). 
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years, it is virtually impossible that any other health care system in the area 
would have a comparable market share in that time. Every other health care 
system in the area would have to merge into one system to match that kind of 
market share. This type of merger almost certainly would be rejected by the 
attorney general, the FTC, or the DOJ because of the clear anti-competitive 
effect it would have in creating a two-player market where a multi-player 
market previously existed. 
B. Medical Device Competition Concerns 
For medical devices, the competition issues for consumers are somewhat 
different. Unlike hospitals and physician groups, which seem always to be on 
the search for their next merger, the big medical device companies are not 
necessarily interested in merging with one another to take over a specific 
region. Some smaller device companies merge with similar-sized and larger 
companies, and some companies seek mergers abroad.167 However, these 
companies are more concerned with excluding their overseas competition from 
U.S. sales than they are concerned about competition within them.168 In an 
article published in April 2014, two attorneys discuss this problem in terms of 
antitrust concerns and intellectual property laws.169 The attorneys determined 
that the medical device companies are not acting anti-competitively because 
there is no real evidence that they are colluding with each other to raise 
prices.170 However, this view overlooks another aspect of antitrust that is very 
relevant to the antitrust discussion. While hospitals are trying to create super 
systems to gain market share, these large technology companies are trying to 
keep smaller and foreign competition, which may offer devices at a 
significantly lower price, out of the market.171 The device companies likely 
would prefer to have a larger share of their respective market, but are equally 
interested in making sure foreign companies do not get a share. Further 
motivating the domestic device companies to control the market, development 
of non-U.S. medical device manufacturing has begun to cut into the 
profitability and global market power of the U.S. companies.172 
The way in which medical device companies control the market is by 
spending millions of dollars lobbying in Washington D.C. to control 
 
 167. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 62, at 8-9. 
 168. Id. at 13. 
 169. Roger D. Blair et al., Patents, Monopoly Pricing, and Antitrust in Health Care Markets, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2014, at 1, 2. 
 170. Id. at 5. 
 171. See generally INT’L. TRADE ADMIN., supra note 62. 
 172. Compare SELECT USA, supra note 61, with INT’L. TRADE ADMIN., supra note 62, at 4. 
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regulations that apply to them and their would-be competitors.173 Most 
recently, the medical device industry lobbied hard against a condition written 
into the ACA that requires a 2.3% tax on the sale of their products.174 These 
lobbying efforts seem to have paid off, at least for the next two years.175 The 
legislative fight began in the form of a House bill to repeal the tax, a bill that 
was supported by both republican and democratic members from the states in 
which the medical device companies are located.176 In December 2015, both 
the House and Senate approved a suspension of the tax for two years as part of 
the congressional spending bill.177 
The medical device companies argued that such a tax would be detrimental 
to their R&D programs and hinder job growth, and alleged that the tax would 
ultimately fall on the consumer to pay.178 However, this argument fails to 
recognize that only about six percent of the industry’s earnings are actually 
reinvested into R&D for their products.179 In fact, the Congressional Research 
Service released its findings on the tax effects in November 2014 and noted 
that the tax will not likely harm the device companies’ profits, and “estimate[d] 
that it will reduce industry output and employment by no more than .2 
percent.”180 Whether or not the tax would actually harm these companies is 
debatable and only determinable with time, but the consumers would almost 
certainly draw the short end of the stick, as so often occurs in health care. 
Furthermore, the risk of repeal has significantly greater repercussions; if 
other industries that are disgruntled with ACA monetary provisions see the 
medical device tax successfully repealed, they too may try to repeal applicable 
provisions, putting up to $370 billion at risk.181 The medical device tax alone 
was expected to garner thirty billion dollars over the next ten years, money that 
was already earmarked for funding other projects.182 The statistics and facts 
seem to indicate that if these companies charge more, it is not because they 
 
 173. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., supra note 63. Over thirty-two million dollars were 
spent on lobbying by the industry. Id. 
 174. Id. (note in charts, the dollars lobbied in 2012-2014 and the states that received the most 
lobbying support—same as the states with large medical device manufacturing industries); see 
also 26 U.S.C. § 4191(a) (2012). 
 175. Kristina Peterson, Congress Passes $1.15 Trillion Spending Bill, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-passes-1-15-trillion-spending-bill-1450450381. 
 176. Daniel, supra note 64. 
 177. Id.; Peterson, supra note 175. 
 178. Daniel, supra note 64. 
 179. Geire, supra note 150, at 248. 
 180. Daniel, supra note 64 (finding the “domestic revenues for medical technology firms 
grew 4 percent to $336 billion in 2013, the first year the tax went into effect – about the same rate 
from 2012, indicating that the industry seems financially stable for now” with the tax in effect). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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must do so in order to recover losses from manufacturing and development, but 
perhaps simply because there is no regulation to prevent them from doing so. 
VI.  RATE REGULATION AND COMPETITION GOING FORWARD 
A. Health Care Industry 
When looking to potential solutions, it is important to remember that there 
are many hurdles to overcome before most changes can be implemented. 
Likewise, it often takes a significant amount of time before any changes have a 
noticeable effect. For instance, realistically, Medicare takes months and 
sometimes years to change because the process of proposing, commenting on, 
and finalizing rules requires extensive time. So even if changes are made to the 
current regulations or laws, like the passage of the Medicare Access and CHIP 
Reauthorization Act (MACRA) in April 2015,183 the effects will take time to 
develop. Despite this delay, as the ACA begins to have a stronger effect on the 
overall health care market, solutions are needed to enable its goals and protect 
consumers. There are, as previously mentioned, options for agencies and 
attorneys general to use structural and conduct remedies to monitor care 
mergers. 
For the Partners case study described in detail in Part IV.A, the HPC 
suggested that the Attorney General and the court make the proposed 
settlement conditions permanent instead of temporary.184 This way, the 
extremely powerful Partners system would have been unable to further expand 
its market control or price out the rest of its competitors permanently. Had the 
settlement been approved, the DOJ and FTC could have assessed how Partners 
and its remaining competitors handled the limitations for the next five to ten 
years. The agencies could have used those results as an opportunity to see 
whether conduct or structural remedies are truly more effective in the long run. 
Because the settlement was thrown out, it is difficult to speculate on the 
potential outcome of the deal. But, similar settlement offers may develop in the 
future and provide agencies with an opportunity to assess such outcomes. 
When the ACA was passed, it included a transparency rule that required all 
hospitals to make their chargemaster lists publicly available or to publicly 
disclose how to obtain the information on the lists.185 However, it has been a 
struggle to get participation by hospitals. To further enforce this mandate, 
CMS posted a reminder to hospitals to comply with this condition in its 
 
 183. See generally Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-
10, 129 Stat. 87 (2015). 
 184. See HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83. 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(e) (2012); Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/research-statis 
tics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/medicare-provider-charge-data/. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
322 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 9:297 
proposed rules from May 2014 and reiterated this point in its final rule as 
well.186 CMS believes that this pricing transparency will enable patients to be 
better informed and make smarter financial decisions with health care, while 
making hospitals more accountable for their prices.187 
To better encourage hospitals to comply with this requirement, CMS could 
implement a penalty system for noncompliant hospitals in the form of 
Medicare reimbursement restrictions or monetary penalties imposed on the 
hospital itself. Some states have also taken a role in this initiative and have 
passed their own legislation that requires hospitals to post their prices for 
services.188 The posting of chargemasters is a step in the right direction for 
price transparency, but it is limited in effect. Posting chargemaster lists will not 
guarantee consumers a designated price because each doctor uses different 
tools, products, and methods to administer a service to patients. Doctors are 
loyal to different medical device manufacturing companies, which all charge 
different rates for their products.189 What consumers need most is a publicly 
available set price for a service, one that would be the same across the board 
for all patients.190 Excluding the public availability of information, this is 
roughly how insurance plans, Medicare, and Medicaid function, and it has 
been fairly successful for them. 
Additionally, insurers are in the unique position to determine exactly 
which facilities and doctors they will cover and where geographically they will 
offer coverage. Because of this, insurers could take advantage of medical care 
options abroad by extending coverage to certain facilities and doctors that are 
certified by an organization for offering approved quality care.191 One of the 
biggest hurdles that these insurers would face is beneficiary concern over 
foreign standards of care. When this approach was attempted in 2006 in North 
Carolina and West Virginia, it was rejected because people were hesitant about 
outsourcing medical care.192 More education on the available resources abroad 
may help ease this concern as might the ever-rising medical costs in the U.S. 
 
 186. Section M Requirement for Transparency of Hospital Charges Under the ACA, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 27,978, 28,169 (proposed May 15, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 405, 412, 413, 415, 
422, 424, 485, and 488). 
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Health Care, 49 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 583, 585-86 (2014). 
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As prices rise, people may be more willing to consider foreign options if 
they are certified by an organization and covered by their insurance. As the 
high prices of American health care continue to climb and influence people’s 
medical decisions, more insurers may begin to consider this option. This 
concept of “medical tourism” offers many positive benefits but is not without 
its problems. In order for this type of program to be safe and effective, 
beneficiaries will likely need assurance that their health information is kept 
private, in other words, that the Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) extends to foreign providers.193 
There also needs to be a malpractice agreement that gives some power to 
the beneficiary through a court or arbitration proceeding in case of 
negligence.194 These are just a sample of the concerns regarding medical 
tourism, but, if resolved, Americans and their insurers are likely to experience 
savings of forty to ninety percent compared to what they would pay for 
domestic care.195 
An alternative, more favorable solution has been the recent trend of 
employers and insurers to offer domestic medical tourism to beneficiaries 
willing to travel to another state for care.196 The benefit to domestic medical 
tourism is the guarantee of quality, privacy, and legal rights, in addition to 
saving money.197 This trend has seen great success by the companies that have 
implemented it in their insurance policies.198 Patients and insurers will not see 
as great of savings with this option compared to foreign medical tourism, but 
the greater assurance of quality care may make this option more viable. This 
domestic tourism could cause medical service prices to increase in the more 
competitively priced markets being used, but it could also influence other 
markets to lower their prices to match those prices offered elsewhere. As the 
domestic medical tourism movement strengthens, it could inadvertently create 
self-regulation within the health care industry. 
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B. Medical Device Industry 
It would be unfair to say that agencies have done nothing to control 
medical technology companies’ antitrust behavior. As mentioned previously, 
the DOJ investigates these companies often under the False Claims Act and 
sometimes finds sufficient evidence of illegal kickbacks to physicians by 
companies encouraging physician use of their products.199 However, the 
parties often settle before a final judgment can be made, so the companies are 
typically only punished monetarily.200 Furthermore, when the DOJ settles with 
these companies, they are not forced to admit any wrongdoing, thus the 
companies avoid harsher penalties that may have more influential effects.201 
As such, financial disincentives from the government do not seem to be 
effective enough to change the way these companies conduct business. This is 
evident by the recovery of $14.2 billion—more than half the total recovery 
from all False Claims Act cases since 2009—by the DOJ from fraud cases 
involving federal health care programs.202 In addition to regulatory difficulties, 
the lobbying stronghold of the medical device industry also poses a great 
challenge to overcome when seeking governmental action. 
Given these challenges, the best method of controlling the rising prices 
may be in the hands of the parties with whom the companies contract. For 
instance, CMS contracts with these medical device companies to provide 
payment for the products used by government-sponsored beneficiaries.203 
Because CMS sets a low threshold for payment, the government could use this 
threshold as a baseline benchmark and restrict pricing above a certain 
percentage of that for all negotiating parties, including private and self-payors. 
This would likely be a fair representation of value since CMS uses a variety of 
data to determine the actual cost of the products.204 This government-induced 
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rate regulation on medical device makers has the potential to be the most 
effective means of controlling the market prices of the products because the 
government has the capability to create the regulation and monitor its 
effectiveness. However, such a government regulation may be unlikely to 
succeed, especially with the powerful lobbying group the industry has 
cultivated. 
A more likely alternative could be to encourage the insurers and physicians 
with whom these companies contract to implement a more limited bidding 
process. For example, a doctor who tried this approach managed to 
successfully reduce his cost for a product by thirty percent by using a blind 
bidding process directly with the manufacturers and choosing only to use one 
of two types of implants.205 Taken on a larger scale, this type of blind bidding 
process with limited options could be effective in driving down these costs for 
insurers. The insurance companies are required to cover certain treatment 
options according to the ACA and their contracts with beneficiaries,206 but 
they could use a stricter form of blind bidding with limited options to 
discourage the medical device companies from maximizing rates. 
For medical device competition control, there could also be amendments to 
current intellectual property laws, specifically patent protections. However, 
patent law is beyond the scope of this article, and, as such, will not be 
discussed in detail. Such changes would likely be the responsibility of the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) through stricter regulation management. 
The FDA also plays a role in the management of antitrust problems in this 
industry as well as the management of unnecessary medical expenses. The 
FDA is the agency that governs medical equipment companies’ devices and the 
marketability of the devices.207 An interesting aspect of the FDA is that it does 
not consider price when approving a new device for the market.208 Its only 
requirement for permissibility is that the device is effective in the ways in 
which it claims to be, and such effectiveness is sufficiently supported through 
scientific evidence.209 Because of this, one way to control the prices of medical 
devices is for the FDA to implement a cost analysis in its approval process of 
new devices. This way, the market would not be inundated with variations of 
one product, all with new legal protections and high prices attached. The FDA 
could take many different steps to control these device companies through 
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patent monitoring in conjunction with the PTO. However, as previously noted, 
patent law is not within the scope of this article. 
The federal government or a state government could try an approach 
similar to that of Belgium’s national health care system. In the case study of 
the man with the joint replacement, he was able to have such affordable 
treatment because Belgium has a required insurance policy for all citizens and 
has enacted regulations on hospitals and physicians regarding how much they 
can be reimbursed for services.210 This policy extends to the medical device 
market as well.211 Patients can expect a set fee for a service that is negotiated 
with the government on an annual basis.212 Physicians are dis-incentivized 
from charging more than the government negotiated price because patients 
know they can seek treatment from a more affordable source.213 Such an 
approach is very unlikely given the political state of the U.S., but it could make 
a great example for states to use as a guide or suggestion when considering 
how best to control health care costs within their own borders. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The health care industry in the U.S. is wrought with obstacles for 
consumers to overcome. Access to quality care is important for all, but it often 
comes at a high price, especially in markets with less provider competition. In 
these markets, understanding the economic principles that led to monopolistic 
health care can help people find solutions to make care more affordable. The 
lack of regulations governing health care rates and the difficulty in enforcing 
existing regulations has put this country’s consumers at a disadvantage. From 
the medical device companies that have taken over the market in the past few 
years to the hospitals that use the products and assign pricing, the consequence 
of ineffective regulation and reduced competition is apparent in the health care 
expense statistics. 
The overall health care industry’s cost to consumers is rising at an 
unsustainable rate. People simply cannot afford to allocate half of their income 
towards health care in the future, a very real possibility if significant changes 
do not occur.214 Consumers need regulations from government agencies to help 
control the rising costs of medical services. They also need better access to 
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information so they can be well-informed consumers and make medical 
decisions that are financially smart. 
In order to empower people to take control of their health care, providers 
within the industry need incentives—positive or negative. In the medical 
device industry, a stronger concerted effort may be needed from federal and 
state governments, physicians, hospitals, and private insurers to force lower 
prices. Similarly, it may take a stronger pushback from public consumers, 
private insurers, and government to force health care providers with large 
market power to lower prices, have transparency in costs, and establish set 
prices for services. 
Security in health is one of most important needs of the well-known 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, second only to food and shelter.215 Americans 
need to feel secure in their ability to access and afford quality health care. 
Therefore, it is imperative for the industry to change to meet the needs of the 
consumers, on whom the industry is dependent in order to be successful. 
Instead of looking at health care as consumer reliance on the industry for a 
service, providers must realize that pricing out the consumers will ultimately 
cycle back to hurt the providers’ businesses. Change is necessary to have a 
sustainable health care future for this country. 
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